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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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31 December 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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ROUTES INTO ZAMBIA



Zambia: [Prospects remain bleak for rapidly increasing land transport into Zambia.]

[The first substantial shipment of oil to Zambia by river and rail through the Congo is not expected to arrive for some weeks. Even this delivery date depends on the transfer to the Congo rail system of equipment and personnel from the jointly owned Zambia-Rhodesia railway. Zambia fears that Rhodesia might retaliate if asked to approve such a transfer. An additional factor is the continued need for Rhodesian coal to operate the Congolese rail route as well as Zambia's copper mines.]

[Lisbon has approved in principle the use of Mozambique and Angola for emergency supplies to Zambia, but with the proviso that any arrangement would be terminated if it proved to be against Portugal's interests. The Angola route is limited by its dependence on the link through the Congo. Any surface traffic through Mozambique must pass through Malawi and then over secondary roads.]

[A Stanford Research Institute survey of the largely unpaved Great North Road, the only important surface connection with Tanzania now usable, confirms earlier reports that heavy traffic could quickly destroy it during the current rainy season without a substantial emergency maintenance program.]

[There appears to be little likelihood of significant assistance to Zambia from the USSR. The Zambian delegation recently in Moscow apparently received only very vague offers of support. The Soviets hinted that they might provide some land transport to help Zambia obtain economic supplies from East Africa. No commitment to any form of military assistance was made.]

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Indonesia: [Army leaders are bitter at President Sukarno's evasion of their demands to ban the Communist Party, but still appear inclined not to move directly against him.]

[With the PKI organization effectively demolished despite Sukarno's foot-dragging, Indonesian politicians and perhaps some army officers appear to be thinking wishfully of Sukarno as their next target. Reports and rumors are circulating of an undefined army move against the President in the near future.]

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[Sukarno, having successfully parried demands to ban the PKI, is going through the motion of sending "fact-finding committees" to three provinces in which military and Moslem civilian anti-Communist activity has been greatest.]

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Venezuela: [Communist guerrilla leaders have rebelled against the orthodox Communist Party (PCV) to ensure themselves a freer hand in conducting guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity.]

[The leaders of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) have formed their own central committee, have begun to reorganize the FALN, have agreed with the extremists of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left to form a united command of the National Liberation Front, and have announced the move to the major foreign Communist parties in hopes of gaining their support. All active FALN guerrilla commands except one have accepted the new leadership.]

[A major split has been brewing for several months between violence-minded leaders of the FALN and the politburo of the PCV, which recommends restraint and a return to legitimate political activity. Serious setbacks suffered recently by the FALN added strength to the politburo's arguments. FALN leaders have complained that the PCV contributed to the reverses by providing less than adequate support, especially money.]

[FALN leaders probably expect to finance future activity with the proceeds from "commercial operations"--bank robberies and other thefts--and presumably hope for funds from Communists abroad. In November FALN representatives met with European Communists in Rome and presumably explored ways of funding FALN activities.]

[These developments confront the Soviet Union with some difficult problems. As a general policy, the Soviet Union has been encouraging the Latin American Communists to adopt a program seeking broader popular support and not restricted to armed struggle at this time.]

(continued)

[Moscow has, however, supplied some of the funds for the FALN's campaign of armed struggle, partly in the hope of being able to exercise some leverage over its future course. Despite such assistance, Moscow has counseled prudence and has avoided becoming directly involved.]

[At the Tri-Continent Conference at Havana which opens on 3 January, the USSR will probably make known its dissatisfaction with the FALN decision in private discussions with the delegations and may point out that such steps can jeopardize the long-range interests of progressive forces in Venezuela. For their part, the Chinese can be expected to hail the decision as a major setback for Soviet influence among Latin American parties.]

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Dominican Republic: [Garcia Godoy has decided to delay any decision concerning the participants in the Santiago fighting until after the New Year holiday. The President hopes that a respite will reduce tensions and ease the situation.]

[] moderate and extreme leftists are discussing plans for a unified general strike, possibly in mid-January, if the provisional regime does not take severe measures against the regular military.]

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